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Abstract
This contribution provides evidence for the hypothesis that trade
increases growth through its curbing e⁄ect on capital taxes. The
analysed trade-growth channel includes a negative impact of open-
ness on corporate taxes and a negative e⁄ect of taxes on growth. The
paper explores the two steps theoretically and empirically, taking into
account the critical points of recent studies in this ￿eld. Estimations
with panel data for a sample of 12 OECD countries in the period
1965-1999 con￿rm a signi￿cant and robust impact of trade on growth
through corporate taxes.
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11 Introduction
Capital is internationally mobile and, at the same time, crucial for economic dy-
namics. More mobility does not necessarily result in more growth, however. The
growth rate depends on accumulation incentives, which can increase or decrease
with globalisation, see Grossman/Helpman (1991). But goods and factor trade
may entail additional mechanisms which unambiguously enhance the accumula-
tion of new capital. According to theory, productivity, competition, market size,
and resource reallocation mechanisms can be considered, see Ventura (2004). In
the empirical work, various additional channels of government policies and tech-
nology di⁄usion have been tested by Wacziarg (2001). This paper argues that one
of the prominent but largely neglected channels is the e⁄ect operating through
capital taxes. Tax competition theory predicts that increasing globalisation forces
governments to reduce taxes on more mobile assets, which - under fairly general
conditions - increases growth. Thus the connection is readily given: the pressure
on exactly those taxes that seem to be crucial for the growth rate is able to provide
a direct link between trade and growth.
The underlying model for the capital tax mechanism can be derived from
￿rst principles. Tax competition theory argues that, in equilibrium, marginal
bene￿ts of public activities correspond to marginal costs of taxation. In an open
economy, any increase in the tax rate of capital causes a capital out￿ ow to other
economies, which is a ￿scal externality. Costs for capital holders to shift capital
abroad fall with lower capital trade restrictions and/or with increasing openness
of the economy, see Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991). Thus rising openness
increases the externality and decreases capital tax rates. The impact from capital
taxes on growth is given by the e⁄ect on the private return on investment. Easterly
and Rebelo (1993) point out that ￿it is hard to think of an in￿ uence on the private
rate of return and on the growth rate that is more direct than that of income taxes.
If these do not a⁄ect the rate of growth, what does?￿
The search for robust channels in the trade-growth relationship makes a contri-
bution to a central but controversial issue in the current macroeconomic debate.
Michaely (1977), Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995) and Edwards (1992)
￿nd a positive impact of trade and open trade policies on the growth rate, while
recent papers do not come to unanimous conclusions. Edwards (1998) con￿rms
the earlier results but Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) remain very skeptical re-
garding the general validity of the positive connection. Levine and Renelt (1992)
and Temple (1999) emphasise that various traditional cross-country studies suf-
fer from methodological problems. Wacziarg and Welch (2003) con￿rm the low
robustness of the nexus for cross-sectional studies but ￿nd new evidence when
focusing on within-country growth. Frankel and Romer (1999) comment that, in
2their opinion, trade is a "very noisy proxy for income-promoting interactions".
Reconsidering several important studies, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) conclude
that open trade policies are not signi￿cantly associated with economic growth,
once other relevant country characteristics are controlled for. They suspect that
the relationship between trade and growth depends on additional characteristics
and argue that ￿scrutinizing the channels through which trade policies in￿ uence
economic performance is likely to be more productive￿before they conclude that
￿the challenge of identifying the connections between trade policy and economic
growth" is crucial for any further research in this ￿eld.
This paper adds to the literature in several respects. First, taking the critique
of Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) seriously, it identi￿es and explores the trade-tax-
growth channel both theoretically and empirically. Second, empirical estimations
take recently discussed econometric problems into account. By concentrating
on OECD countries the contribution avoids estimation problems of large cross-
country samples. The 12 leading OECD countries considered are quite similar,
e.g. regarding factor endowments, market structures, and institutions, so that the
aim of identifying and separating the tax e⁄ects seems to be promising. The time
period under study covers a su¢ ciently long horizon and the use of ￿ve-year inter-
vals helps to minimise business cycle e⁄ects. Third, the paper sheds a speci￿c light
on the relationship between institutions and growth, with the tax-setting govern-
ment in a globalising world as institutional actor. In particular, it adds speci￿c
knowledge on developed countries, while many other studies concentrate on less
developed economies or mixed samples. Finally, for the empirical estimation of
the tax channel, the paper applies the method of Tavares and Wacziarg (2001)
and Wacziarg (2001) to the tax competition literature. We estimate the two es-
timation equations jointly using three-stage least squares, so that consistency is
achieved by instrumentation and e¢ ciency is reached by appropriate weighting
using the covariance matrix from the second stage of the procedure.
The two relationships of the tax channel mechanism appear to be very intu-
itive. Nevertheless, both links have been questioned in the literature, which is
an additional challenge for the present study. Regarding tax competition, early
empirical studies such as Garrett (1995), Quinn (1997) and Swank (1998) do not
￿nd that increasing globalisation decreases the tax rates. Concerning the dynamic
impact of taxes, Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) show that, in an overlapping genera-
tions economy, lower capital taxes can in fact decrease the growth rate. This may
happen because taxing capital relieves the tax burden on the young generation
which enables it to save more. We argue that the empirical doubts about the valid-
ity of tax competition theory can be cleared up once we use appropriate data and
estimation models. In addition, the theoretical result of Uhlig and Yanagawa does
not materialise in our data sample. On the contrary, the empirical results show
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trade and growth can be con￿rmed. Finally, it has been argued by Rodrik (2005)
that the interpretation of growth regressions with purposeful policies as explana-
tory variables is problematic. Given the tax competition set-up, however, we do
not assume purposeful tax changes, but policies that are enforced by globalisation,
i.e. by outside forces.
Of course, the speci￿c channel between trade and growth in this paper has
to be seen as a complement to other possible links like scale, accumulation and
productivity e⁄ects, treated in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), Eaton and Kor-
tum (2001), Keller (2002), Baldwin (2003), Lee, Ricci, and Rigobon (2004), and
Alcala and Ciccone (2004); related policy and institutional issues are dealt with
in Kneller, Bleany and Gemmell (1999), Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), Dollar
and Kraay (2003), Yanikkaya (2003), Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004), and
Winters (2004), who convincingly argues that openness is not a substitute for a
comprehensive development strategy.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
model which is the basis for empirical estimations. In Section 3, the estimation
method and the data are discussed. Section 4 provides empirical evidence for the
capital tax channel in OECD countries. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The theoretical framework
Following the causal chain from trade to capital taxes to growth, the theoretical
approach presented here necessarily includes the formulation of two relationships:
the ￿rst is the impact of trade and trade policy on capital taxes, the second the
e⁄ect of capital taxes on growth. Let us present a simple approach to formalise the
basic idea. For simplicity, we assume that the government levies a proportional
capital income tax with a proportional tax rate ￿ to ￿nance a public consumption
good. In a closed economy without distortions, the government chooses an opti-
mal tax rate ￿￿ such that the marginal bene￿t of the public good MB equals the
marginal costs MC (Samuelson rule), see Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991).
MB depends on individual utility of public services and the ideological preferences
of the government, the parliament, and the electorate. It is normally postulated
that conservative governments favour a lower level of public activities and a lower
capital taxation, while leftist governments favour redistribution and a higher cap-
ital taxation. In an open economy, MC contains two parts. On the one hand, it
re￿ ects marginal individual costs of taxation MCpriv. On the other hand, an in-
crease in ￿ leads to a capital out￿ ow, decreasing the home tax base and increasing
marginal cost of taxation by MCoutfl. The more open the economy the larger is




with ￿ < ￿￿; MB = MB(gov); MCoutfl = MCoutfl(open)
gov denotes the preferences of political actors and open is a measure of the
openness of the economy. Thus, capital taxes are predicted to be lower, the more
open is the economy and/or the lower are restrictions on international capital
markets, once the preferences of the government are controlled for.
Using a neo-classical production function Y = AK￿L1￿￿ with Y;A;K;and
L denoting output, total factor productivity, capital, and labour, and assuming
0 < ￿ < 1, we obtain the private marginal product of capital MPKP as:





where y is per capita income. Inserting (2) into the Keynes-Ramsey rule
for intertemporal optimisation of in￿nitely lived households yields the per capita









￿ ￿ (￿ + gL + gA)
i
(3)
where 1=￿ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ￿ the depreciation
rate, gL population growth, and gA technical progress.
From (1) we obtain the ￿rst and from (3) the second estimation equation,
according to:
￿i = ￿0 + ￿1openi + ￿2govi + ￿3Z
0
i + ￿i￿ (4)
gi = ￿0 + ￿1￿i + ￿2 ln yi0 + ￿3X
0
i + ￿ig (5)
i is a country index while Z0 and X0 are vectors of control variables; ￿￿ and
￿g denote the error terms. ￿1and ￿2 as well as ￿1 and ￿2 are expected to have a
negative sign. Equation (4) describes the impact of globalisation on the channel
variable which is the capital tax rate, equation (5) re￿ ects the e⁄ect of the channel
variable on economic growth.
According to (4) and (5), the endogenous variables of the system are the tax
rate and the per capita growth rate. As right-hand variables we introduce open-
ness captured by trade measures and qualitative indices for capital and current
account restrictions, the country area, the log of initial income, initial human
capital, the investment share, population growth and the country size; for an
endogenous treatment of country size see Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2004).
53 Estimation Method and Data
3.1 Econometric issues
In cross-country studies on trade and growth, econometric problems such as si-
multaneity, parameter heterogeneity and missing variables have especially to be
considered, see Temple (1999). Simultaneity arises because ￿countries whose in-
comes are high for reasons other than trade may trade more￿(Frankel and Romer
1999, p. 379). These authors use geographical variables for the construction of
appropriate instruments to correct for this bias. In a similar way, we will also in-
troduce geographical instruments in the regressions. However, we will emphasise
the growth and not the level e⁄ects of income, as done in Hall and Jones (1999)
and Frankel and Romer (1999). According to Baldwin (1989, 1992) in his response
to the EU-common-market studies, the distinction between level and growth ef-
fects of trade is a crucial issue. Consequently, the problem of simultaneity is
also distinct in the two cases. A one-shot (unilateral) increase in productivity
can plausibly alter a country￿ s specialization and trade position. But a change in
continuous productivity growth is normally due to improvements in mainly domes-
tically oriented sectors such as research and education. Hence, a higher growth
rate is not directly tied to higher trade volumes or trade shares. Accordingly,
direct empirical observations on the impact of growth on trade shares remain in-
conclusive. For example, in the period 1993-2000, the US economy showed strong
growth, which is commonly attributed to domestic factors such as a favourable
macroeconomic environment and the widespread use of new information technolo-
gies. However, in the same period the export share increased only slightly from
around 10 to 11 percent. In Japan, growth was much weaker in the same period;
nevertheless, the export share rose more, from 9 to 11 percent. The di⁄erence to
Germany is even more striking: there, growth was relatively modest in this time
period but the export share increased from 22 to 34 percent!
A second econometric problem is the pervasive parameter heterogeneity, which
arises from the use of large samples including very di⁄erent countries. On the one
hand, problems of data quality and outliers are well known and can be addressed
with appropriate sensitivity tests. But there are good reasons to suggest that the
mechanisms transmitting the impact of trade on growth vary when we compare
di⁄erent countries, notably LDCs and leading economies. Whereas for develop-
ing countries, the strengthening of market forces might be a main channel in the
trade-growth nexus at work, this e⁄ect seems to be less important for industri-
alised countries. In addition, the growth e⁄ects of trade depend on comparative
advantage, see Grossman and Helpman (1991), which varies strongly between
very di⁄erent countries. If theory is richer than is expressed in the current empir-
6ical studies, the problem of omitted variables is also a serious obstacle for good
estimation results.
By restricting our analysis to only 12 highly developed economies with similar
factor endowments and institutional background, using appropriate instruments
and adopting a simultaneous estimation approach we aim to reduce as far as
possible the econometric problems raised.
3.2 Estimation procedure
In the present paper, the system consisting of equations (4) and (5) is esti-
mated jointly using three-stage least squares. The procedure follows Tavares and
Wacziarg (2001) and Wacziarg (2001). In the ￿rst step, for each of the two equa-
tions, a reduced-form coe¢ cient matrix is estimated using OLS. In the second
step, 2SLS is adopted to estimate the structural model. Finally, in the third step,
the estimated covariance matrix from step 2 and the ￿tted values of the endoge-
nous variables of step 1 are used for an IV-GLS estimation applied to the stacked
structural model. By applying this estimation procedure, consistency is achieved
by instrumentation while e¢ ciency is reached by appropriate weighting when us-
ing the covariance matrix from the second stage. As in Tavares and Wacziarg
(2001) we restrict all non-contemporary coe¢ cients to zero.
By using a su¢ cient number of exogenous variables and instruments we aim
at reducing the scope for omitted variable bias. As instruments we use a variety
of predetermined economic and geographic variables as well as country and time
period dummies. Speci￿cally, we introduce in all equations the square of the log of
initial income, the logarithm of population, the average distance to trade partners,
the land area, dummies for all the countries with the exception of the UK and for
all time periods except 1995-99.
3.3 The data
To measure trade and the openness of an economy, a common variable used in
empirical studies is the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. For
￿nancial market liberalisation, most studies use a qualitative measure constructed
by analysing inward and outward capital and current account restrictions and by
regarding international legal agreements that constrain a nation￿ s ability to re-
strict exchange and capital ￿ ows. The series of Quinn (1997) contain indices for
capital and goods market restrictions. By including both types of variables be-
low we acknowledge the fact that openness for goods and for capital are, although
linked by the balance of payments, not necessarily identical. It will turn out, how-
ever, that the quantitative trade variable performs much better than the indices
7in our sample. The reason seems to be that, for OECD countries, the variation
of the indices is comparatively low.
E⁄ective tax burden of ￿rms is determined not only by the statutory tax rate
but also by the determination of the legal tax base, which di⁄ers due to complex
national di⁄erences in tax-credits, tax-exemptions and tax-deductions for identical
operating surpluses. Capital tax revenue as a share of GDP was used by Garrett
(1995), Quinn (1997) and Swank (1998). But since capital tax revenue as a percent
of GDP equals capital tax rates times the capital base divided by total income,
the observed relationship is not necessarily incompatible with greater openness
reducing the tax rate. If, at the same time, openness raises the capital/output
ratio and, especially, if it does so by means of lower tax rates, a positive impact
of globalisation on tax revenue can be expected, according to theory.
Table 1: Data
Used variables and sources
Variable Description Source
corptax corporate tax rate OECD (1998a,b), (2005)
open exports+imports/GDP PWT 6.1
capital restrictions on payments and receipts Quinn (1997)
of capital
openness capital and current account restrictions Quinn (1997)
growth real per capita GDP growth, const. PWT 6.1
prices, chain series
gov Center of political gravity :government, Cusack (1997), Cusack
cabinet, and electorate and Engelhardt (2002)
area land area Barro/Lee (1994)
logincome log of initial GDP per capita PWT 6.1
human initial years of average schooling Barro/Lee (2000)
invest average investment share PWT 6.1
popgrowth population growth PWT 6.1
size GDP per capita x population PWT 6.1
Therefore, e⁄ective tax rates are used for the estimations below. These rates
are calculated by dividing total tax revenues from corporate taxation by the oper-
ating surplus of corporate enterprises, according to the methodology proposed in
Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994). As e⁄ective capital tax rates incorporate taxes
on immovable properties with a very inelastic tax base, corporate taxes are better
suited to testing the theoretical predictions of the tax competition model. Fur-
thermore, a large share of corporate capital belongs to multinational ￿rms and is
thus especially mobile. The quality of the tax competition results in this paper is
8compatible with the outcome in Rodrik (1997) and Bretschger and Hettich (2002),
where, however, annual data are used for single equation estimations, which does
not allow the channel and the endogenous growth perspective taken here.
E⁄ective corporate tax rates are calculated with OECD tax data as the sum
of tax revenues of corparate taxation plus tax revenues on companies￿assets, both
taken from the revenue statistics (OECD 1998a), divided by net operating surplus
of corporations, taken from the national accounts (OECD 1998b). Data for 1997-
99 are calculated by using OECD (2002). The other data sources are described in
table 1. PWT 6.1 refers to the Penn Word Table, see Heston, Summers and Aten
(2002).
The sample covers the 12 OECD countries with adequate tax data (Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzer-
land, UK and USA) and range from 1965 to 1999, divided into ￿ve year periods as
follows: 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-1989, 1990-94 and 1995-99. For
some countries, tax data are not available from the beginning, so that the panel
is unbalanced. The summarising description of the series is given in table 2.
Table 2: Description of variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std.dev. Min Max
corptax 70 36.88 14.02 13.20 78.19
gov 84 9.28 1.06 7.14 11.09
capital 84 3.30 0.73 1.5 4
openness 84 11.81 2.00 6.8 14
popgrowth 83 0.005 0.004 -0.002 0.017
invest 83 26.05 5.01 16.99 37.87
open 83 57.84 30.15 10.11 141.73
growth 83 2.43 1.61 -1.61 10.44
logincome 84 9.71 0.28 8.83 10.25
area 84 1830 3535 31 9976
dist 84 3.19 2.14 1.27 8.79
size 83 104.78 152.03 3.95 810.02
human 84 8.43 1.82 3.31 11.89
94 Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries
The two equations derived from theory are used directly for the empirical esti-
mation of the tax channel mechanism. The results are presented in several steps.
In all cases we depart from the core model for the tax and the growth equation
given by equations (4) and (5). The ￿rst equation gives the impact of trade on the
channel variable corptax which appears as an explanatory variable of the growth
regression yielding the e⁄ect of the channel on the growth rate of the economy.
In table 3, several control variables are added in the trade-tax relationship.
Additional control variables for the tax-growth relationship are introduced in table
4. This provides information about the robustness of the central trade-tax-growth
nexus under various speci￿cation conditions. In tables 5 and 6, the same equations
are presented using SUR estimates to check the sensitivity of the results regarding
the estimation method. Finally, table 7 reports the results of further sensitivity
analysis with respect to geography, time periods and estimation procedure.
In table 3, we see that the variable open measuring trade openness is signif-
icant at the 1 % level and has the predicted negative impact on the corporate
tax rate throughout. The estimated parameter values vary between -0.144 and
-0.2 in the di⁄erent equations. The impact of the political variable gov is also
highly signi￿cant, con￿rming that more right wing governments and voters have
strong preferences for lower capital taxes. As larger countries tend to have a lower
dependence on other countries, the geographical variable area shows in equations
(2)-(4) a negative and signi￿cant impact on the tax rate. The qualitative vari-
ables for trade and trade policy of Quinn (1997) are not successful for the OECD
countries. The index capital, a measure of international capital market restric-
tions, and openness, which represents capital and current account restrictions for
the di⁄erent countries, are not signi￿cant in equations (3) and (4), respectively.
In the standard growth regression given in the lower part of the table, the right-
hand variables appear as predicted. The log of initial income logincome is highly
signi￿cant and negative, as expected in this kind of regression. The variable for
corporate taxation corptax is also signi￿cant at the 1 % level and negative as
derived from theory. The estimated parameter value shows little variation.
Table 4 extends the speci￿cation of the growth equation, leaving the three
signi￿cant variables in the tax regression equation. Still, the variable open behaves
as predicted and is highly signi￿cant. Interestingly, the parameter value shows
less variation and lies around -0.18. Also, gov and area have the e⁄ects as in the
previous table. In the growth regression, the impact of logincome and corptax
remain under the various speci￿cations. The estimated parameter value for the
tax rate remains at the same level as in the ￿rst table. The impact of initial
10human capital human is only signi￿cant at the 10 % level while the investment
rate invest is not signi￿cant here. However, the size of the economy size has a
positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on growth as seen in speci￿cations (7) and (8). In
the last column, population growth is added but it is not signi￿cant. This is not
too surprising for a data set including the leading OECD countries only.
Speci￿cation (7) can be seen as the most successful regarding the explanatory
power, it may thus be labelled the "benchmark" estimation. Calculating the
elasticities related to the mean for the estimated parameter values, we obtain an
elasticity of -0.293 for the impact of trade openness on the corporate tax rate,
-0.577 for the e⁄ect of the corporate tax rate on growth, and, ￿nally, a value of
0.17 for the impact of openness on growth via the tax channel. Although highly
signi￿cant according to the estimations, this e⁄ect can be seen as not exorbitantly
high in terms of the elasticity. This is certainly true, but it might be that, in the
longer run, the quantitative e⁄ect is stronger, as investors seem to need a certain
time to adjust to a new tax environment to carry out new projects. It has also
been emphasised in the introduction that the tax channel is not the only operating
channel in this ￿eld so that the size of the elasticity appears to be reasonable.
Tables (5) and (6) present the results using the alternative estimation tech-
nique of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). Speci￿cations (9) through (16)
have the same structure as in (1) to (8). When running the model without instru-
menting for the endogenous variables, inconsistent estimates might be the result.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to see whether large di⁄erences in results are ob-
served when adopting the SUR procedure. One can easily see that this is not the
case here. The general quality of the regressions remain unchanged and the signs
and the signi￿cance of the key variables remain the same. The impact of trade
openness on the tax rate is of the same size, while the e⁄ect of the tax on growth
is a bit lower than for the 3SLS estimations.
Table 7 provides additional information concerning the robustness of the re-
sults. It is based on the "benchmark" speci￿cation. In equations (17) and (18),
respectively, a special dummy for non-European countries is introduced to cap-
ture the speci￿c impact of European policies. One can see that this dummy is not
signi￿cant in either equation.
Since the panel is relatively short in time dimension, equation (19) reports the
results of the alternative estimation method of panel corrected standard errors,
which was designed exactly for panels like the present. Of course, the procedure
is applied to the two equations separately. It is very instructive to see that the
results are very similar to the other estimation procedures, the standard errors are
even smaller in this case making the estimated parameter coe¢ cients even more
signi￿cant. The last three columns (20)-(22) report the results of the benchmark
model for the di⁄erent time periods 1970-99, 1975-99 and 1965-90. When omitting
11the ￿rst or the ￿rst two time periods there are no major changes compared to the
full time range; when leaving out the second half of the 1990s it is interesting to
see that the impact of trade openness on corporate taxes and of corporate taxes
on growth are somewhat smaller.
Table 3: Estimation results I
Endogenous variables: corptax and growth; 3SLS (IV-GLS)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
corptax
const 97.65*** 84.66*** 81.72*** 97.74***
(15.77) (14.66) (14.84) (16.42)
open - 0.144*** - 0.178*** - 0.200*** - 0.149***
(0.051) (0.048) (0.050) (0.053)
gov -5.68*** -3.71** -4.07*** -5.71***
(1.52) (1.47) (1.49) (1.59)







const 43.43*** 44.23*** 43.27*** 42.78***
(5.97) (5.95) (5.96) (5.96)
logincome -4.06*** -4.14*** -4.06*** -4.02***
(0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60)
corptax -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.039*** -0.035***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
# of obs. 69 69 69 69
R2 corptax 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
R2 growth 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.40
￿2 corptax 15.66 15.66 15.66 15.92
￿2 growth 50.84 50.84 50.84 48.06
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Signi￿cant at the 10 % level
** Signi￿cant at the 5 % level
*** Signi￿cant at the 1 % level
12Table 4: Estimation results II
Endogenous variables: corptax and growth; 3SLS (IV-GLS)
Variable (5) (6) (7) (8)
corptax
const 85.41*** 84.42*** 84.29*** 84.57***
(14.72) (14.62) (14.70) (14.72)
open - 0.184*** - 0.177*** - 0.187*** - 0.188***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
gov -3.76** -3.70** -3.63** -3.65**
(1.1.48) (1.46) (1.47) (1.47)
area -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
growth
const 50.59*** 41.16*** 49.08*** 48.98***
(6.91) (6.52) (5.86) (6.14)
logincome -5.04*** -3.93*** -4.69*** -4.69***
(0.78) (0.63) (0.60) (0.61)
corptax -0.031*** -0.046*** -0.038*** -0.036**









# of obs. 69 69 69 69
R2 corptax 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
R2 growth 0.43 0.38 0.46 0.47
￿2 corptax 33.67 34.12 33.51 33.72
￿2 growth 57.64 56.72 67.84 66.34
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Signi￿cant at the 10 % level
** Signi￿cant at the 5 % level
*** Signi￿cant at the 1 % level
13Table 5: Estimation results, alternative method I
Endogenous variables: corptax and growth; estimation method: SUR
Variable (9) (10) (11) (12)
corptax
const 97.99*** 85.36*** 81.89*** 79.78***
(15.81) (14.75) (14.88) (15.47)
open - 0.153*** - 0.187*** - 0.206*** - 0.202***
(0.051) (0.048) (0.050) (0.049)
gov -5.66*** -3.74** -4.10*** -4.05***
(1.53) (1.48) (1.49) (1.49)







const 42.03*** 42.56*** 42.32*** 42.42***
(5.93) (5.93) (5.93) (5.93)
logincome -3.98*** -4.02*** -4.00*** -4.00***
(0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60)
corptax -0.026** -0.030** -0.029** -0.030**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
# of obs. 69 69 69 69
R2 corptax 0.19 0.33 0.34 0.34
R2 growth 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
￿2 corptax 16.05 34.05 36.17 35.87
￿2 growth 46.36 48.53 47.73 48.22
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Signi￿cant at the 10 % level
** Signi￿cant at the 5 % level
*** Signi￿cant at the 1 % level
14Table 6: Estimation results, alternative method II
Endogenous variables: corptax and growth; estimation method: SUR
Variable (13) (14) (15) (16)
corptax
const 85.42*** 85.35*** 85.24*** 84.57***
(14.76) (14.74) (14.76) (14.72)
open - 0.189*** - 0.186*** - 0.189*** - 0.189***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
gov -3.74** -3.74** -3.71** -3.72**
(1.48) (1.48) (1.47) (1.48)
area -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
growth
const 50.27*** 40.73*** 47.77*** 47.29***
(6.91) (6.47) (5.83) (6.03)
logincome -5.01*** -3.89*** -4.61*** -4.57***
(0.78) (0.63) (0.60) (0.61)
corptax -0.020* -0.031*** -0.025** -0.023*









# of obs. 69 69 69 69
R2 corptax 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
R2 growth 0.44 0.41 0.48 0.48
￿2 corptax 33.88 34.24 33.92 33.89
￿2 growth 54.65 50.24 63.50 67.37
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Signi￿cant at the 10 % level
** Signi￿cant at the 5 % level
*** Signi￿cant at the 1 % level
15Table 7: Estimation results, sensitivity analysis
Endogenous variables: corptax and growth; estimation methods 3SLS (IV-GLS), PCSE
Variable (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
(PCSE) (1970-99) (1975-99) (1965-90)
corptax
const 83.99*** 84.93*** 85.35*** 86.15*** 82.95*** 83.72***
(14.96) (14.75) (13.31) (14.30) (16.12) (15.77)
open - 0.189*** - 0.189*** - 0.189*** - 0.225*** -0.23*** -0.19***
(0.051) (0.048) (0.043) (0.046) (0.050) (0.052)
gov -3.57** -3.69** -3.73*** -3.42** -2.98* -3.53**
(1.55) (1.48) (1.23) (1.44) (1.63) (1.60)
area -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***




const 49.06*** 46.94*** 47.54*** 41.72*** 44.30*** 59.53***
(5.86) (5.88) (10.68) (7.13) (9.45) (6.29)
logincome -4.69*** -4.51*** -4.59*** -3.96*** -4.23*** -5.85***
(0.60) (0.60) (1.11) (0.72) (0.95) (0.65)
corptax -0.038*** -0.030** -0.024*** -0.032** -0.030** -0.024*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
size 0.003*** 0.002* 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(0.0009) (0.001) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.001)
dnoneur 0.54
(0.39)
# of obs. 69 69 69 64 56 57
R2 corptax 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.42 0.42 0.35
R2 growth 0.44 0.49 0.48 0.32 0.26 0.60
￿2 corptax 33.88 33.52 84.74 46.75 40.98 31.44
￿2 growth 54.65 69.84 33.45 33.01 22.42 85.06
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Signi￿cant at the 10 % level
** Signi￿cant at the 5 % level
*** Signi￿cant at the 1 % level
165 Conclusions
According to our empirical results, trade fosters growth through its moderating
impact on corporate taxes. The concurrence of two crucial attributes, mobility and
accumulation capability of one single input factor, which is capital, drives the main
result. The outcome is in line with earlier studies ￿nding a positive relationship
between an increasingly globalised environment and the development of a single
country. The paper adds to our understanding by identifying one signi￿cant
channel transmitting the impulses from trade to growth. Other channels may
strengthen or weaken the overall trade-growth nexus but they have not been the
subject of the present contribution.
Of course, the analysed impact on growth is only e⁄ective when trade vol-
umes are increasing and/or trade restrictions are decreasing. That means the
phenomenon vanishes in the (very) long run, assuming that international integra-
tion gradually continues and then comes to an end in the future. But this is not a
special attribute of capital taxes; it corresponds to all potential mechanisms like
international knowledge transmission, competition and institutional e⁄ects.
It would be interesting to know whether globalisation has similar e⁄ects on the
behaviour of governments in areas where the government a⁄ects the levels (not
the growth) of activities or income distribution. This could be analysed with a
similar methodology as used here and is left for future research.
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